Charles of Anjou is a controversial figure in Medieval history. Remembered for the Sicilian Vespers in 1282 and the subsequent loss of Sicily, it has been easy for his life to be portrayed as a complete failure. The truth, however, is more nuanced than this. By considering his rule from both a papal and a dynastic perspective, it is clear he had many successes and the Sicilian Vespers, arguably his biggest failure, was largely the result of inheriting centuries of tough government rather than his sole fault. Although the loss of Sicily meant he appeared to have failed in his endeavours, looking more widely it is clear his reign allowed for a successful papacy and the solidification of his Capetian dynasty. A large number of Charles’ failures were inherited rather than created. His hamartia was his prioritising of ambition over approval from his subjects. It is this that has led to his reputation as a failed king.
To judge the extent of his success or failure, it must be established how these concepts are quantified and the extent to which he achieved each perspective’s goals. From a papal perspective, his goal was to remove the Staufen dynasty from the Regno and reassert the Papacy in the region. From a dynastic perspective, the aim was to expand power and secure strength for the future. Considering the works the likes of Dunbabin and Abulafia, together with contemporary chronicles and letters, it is clear Charles managed to achieve many of his goals and it is, therefore, inaccurate to describe him as a complete failure.[1] Within the established perimeters, Charles of Anjou was more of a success from a dynastic perspective than from a papal one. It must be remembered, however, it is largely in retrospect this is obvious, as many of his successes only became clear later.
To measure the extent of Charles’ success from a papal perspective, the outcomes must be considered against the objectives. It is agreed widely across the historiography that, as Welsh argued, Charles was selected during the 1250s by the Papacy as ‘champion to expel the Staufens from the Regno di Sicilia’.[2] Dunbabin expands on this, arguing the Papacy wanted Charles to overthrow Manfred in order to re-establish papal overlordship, which had been their goal since the Second Council of Lyons.[3] Contemporary writings substantiate these claims. Chronicler, Matthew Paris, wrote that Manfred had been excommunicated ‘as an invader of the kingdom and favourer of the Saracens’ and that Pope Urban IV later ‘gave the kingdom of Sicily to the French king’s brother Charles [of Anjou], but on the condition that he should drive Manfred from the kingdom’.[4] Pope Urban IV, writing to Louis IX, said Charles’ campaign was ‘the means of which we hope, with the favour of the Lord, to liberate the church from her enemies who surround her’.[5] While both Paris, with his known intimacy with both the French and English courts, and the Pope himself clearly had vested interest in portraying Charles’ actions as pious and noble, that the papacy’s intention with Charles was to remove Manfred and re-establish proper religious practice is clear. This considered, the extent to which Charles can be described as a failure is limited.
Following the Battle of Benevento in 1266 and the death of Manfred, Charles became the King of Sicily and established, what Dunbabin referred to as, ‘the Angevin kingdom, which lasted (though in a truncated form) till 1452’.[6] In doing so, he achieved his primary objective: to remove the Staufen dynasty from the region. They were never returned. When there was an uprising led by Staufen claimant Conradin, Charles managed to successfully put it down, winning the Battle of Tagliacozzo and having the heir beheaded in October 1268. Runciman argued harsh actions like this were ‘intolerable to the easy-going Italians’ as the boy was fifteen years old. However, it actually speaks to Charles’ commitment to his mission of Staufen removal and maintenance of power.[7] Lower pointed to the event’s importance, saying ‘Conradin’s death ended the Staufen push from the north’.[8] In this sense, despite some discontentment in the region, Charles was technically a success. When Sicily was eventually lost during the Sicilian Vespers in 1282, it was the Aragonese who took power, not the Staufen dynasty. From the Papal perspective, he had achieved his objective: to remove Manfred.
It would be wrong, however, to assert he was a complete success. Though Abulafia acknowledges Charles saw himself as ‘God’s agent, sent to scourge the unfaithful’, he argues he also was ‘driven by an acute ambition for power’.[9] This meant he was a ruthless leader, contributing to the discontentment resulting in the Vespers. A Genoese poet wrote Charles was ‘greedy even when he was not a count and became doubly so as a king’.[10] Similarly, Pedro III’s chronicler noted the people ‘were greatly angered by the rules of Charles and borne upon heavily by him’.[11] While it must be acknowledged Pedro had married Manfred’s daughter so had a claim to the Sicilian throne so perhaps exaggerated the intensity of Charles’ cruelty , these writings together speak to his failings to maintain peace in Sicily, as was the papacy’s intention for him. His ambition led to him striving for higher office, despite the fact ‘the papacy had brought him into Italy as an anti-imperialist’.[12] Charles went against the original agreement with the Papacy to introduce a fairer system in the region. Dunbabin emphasises the significance of the costs of his ambition, arguing, ‘that Charles’ fiscal policies caused much misery cannot be in doubt’ and ‘if Charles had not been tempted into costly campaigns in 1280 and 1282, the history books might have been very different’.[13] The Subventio generalis, for example, had been transformed into a resented direct tax under Frederick II and maintained under Charles to fund his expeditions. Runciman suggested ‘Charles’ rule was able and efficient. It provided justice and some prosperity. But it was never popular’.[14] His organised administration made his taxation, particularly, harsh on the population and as a result resentment grew, despite the elements of continuity. If he had not been so ambitious and thus needing funds, he would have been able to keep the original agreement with the papacy and perhaps better achieved his objective in the region.
All this considered, from a papal perspective, Charles of Anjou achieved his primary objective: to remove the Staufen dynasty and Manfred from the Regno. However, the eventual loss of Sicily constitutes a failure which cannot be denied. This does not reduce the entire exploit to a failure though. He still managed to re-establish papal strength even with the personal loss, as was the priority.
The analysis of Charles of Anjou’s life from a dynastic perspective illuminates his success. Born into the Capetian Dynasty and brother of King Louis IX, a main objective of Charles would have been to expand their influence and secure both their religious and political strength. In many ways dynastic and personal aims and perspectives were somewhat interchangeable for Charles and his brothers. This can be seen through the brothers’ adoption of titles like ‘frère du roi de France’ (brother of the King of France) and ‘fils de roi de France’ (sons of the King of France), which Le Goff argued was ‘one of the most important signs of the simultaneous reinforcement of the ideas of the dynasty and the “nation”.’[15]That Charles, and his siblings, cared immensely about supporting one another and maintaining their dynasty’s historic power is clear, contrary to Runciman’s assertion he was a only man of honour according to ‘narrow and selfish lights’.[16]
Charles’ actions evidence a clever tactician who acted to expand the dynasty. In 1250 Louis wrote in a letter intended for circulation in France: ‘we have decided to send back to France our very dear brothers, the counts of Poitiers and Anjou, that they may comfort our very dear mother and the whole kingdom’.[17] Despite the clear propaganda purposes of the letter as a whole, Charles’ mention in it shows trust was put in him, by Louis, to handle the unrest in France and quell questions about the implications that failure meant about divine attitudes to the Crusade. This speaks to his capabilities to handle dynastic issues. Here, Charles was able to successfully protect his familial power. Other incidences display similar success. For example, he displayed ability to navigate political tensions and maintain power through his, sometime, leniency towards Muslims. In August 1258, Charles had the Christian rebels killed but spared Muslim soldiers, knowing this would serve him in later crusades.[18] He did this, despite knowing he could be criticised, as he knew this would better support his dynasty’s influence. Baldwin proposed convincing argument relating to Charles’ exploits around the Mediterranean and the Holy Land, disputing the argument Pope Gregory X was a major influence, instead suggesting Charles had greater agency.[19] Charles was able to establish extensive influence in the region himself, without assistance from the Papacy. Expanding into this region widened the power of the Capetians. His ability to control the Holy Land through trading, such as when he withheld supplies in 1274-5 causing starvation, undoubtedly marks a success considering his dynastic objectives to expand power.[20]
Charles successfully created the ideology of the dynasty that shaped future generations. Abuladia argued he stands out as ‘one of a small group of figures who helped remodel monarchy in the late thirteenth century’.[21] Dunbabin, similarly, suggests ‘there is at least one aspect of thinking about later medieval French kingship which was consciously formed by Charles of Anjou, and which came to have a profound effect on later generations: that of the beata stirps (saintly linage)’.[22] When organising the marriages of his son to Maria of Hungary and his daughter to Ladislaus IV of Hungary, as part of what Abuladia called his mission to spread the royal seed, Charles adapted their idea of a Hungarian dynasty of saintly kings.[23] He referred to King Stephen as ‘a valiant, strong prince, descended from a line of saints and great kings’.[24]Charles was, obviously, trying to flatter the King, given the context of arranging a marriage, but, this language marked the beginning him becoming ‘the spokesman of a distinctive theory about their [the Capetians] status and obligations which went on to have an impact on future generations’, as Dunbabin argued.[25] A clear example of this was Charles’ instrumental role in the canonization of his brother Louis. Despite his dying before it finally came into fruition in 1297, Charles’ contribution to the cause was central. He staged a procession following Louis’ death to publicly assert his holiness and in 1282, at the inquiry into his brother’s canonization, Charles said ‘the holy root produced saintly branches saintly branches, not just the saint king but also the count of Artois who was a glorious martyr and the count of Poitiers, a martyr by intention’, expanding the tree of brothers.[26] Charles used this and other writings to the Popes of his lifetime to emphasise the greatness and holiness of the Capetian dynasty. Louis’ canonization increased the family’s prestige and gave future generations privilege by virtue of their ability to emphasise their link to Saint Louis in their titles. Here, Charles was a success, partially in retrospect, as he secured the status of his dynasty for future generations.
To conclude, some key questions must be addressed including from which perspective can Charles of Anjou be seen as most successful? Despite Runciman’s harsh judgement ‘he failed as a man’, it is clear he was not a complete failure.[27]While it is true he made mistakes, some serious, like his handling of the Sicilian Vespers in 1282, there was an overarching element of success to his career. From a papal perspective, Charles’ objective, in simple terms, was to remove Manfred and the Staufen dynasty from the Regno. He achieved this, and, while the eventual loss of Sicily presents some level of failure, the Staufens never regained total control of the region. Though a lot of the causes of discontentment under his rule were inherited from previous leaders, it was a failure of his not to adapt to the conditions, prioritising his ambition over maintaining peace in the Regno, as the Church had hoped he would. From a dynastic perspective, there was greater success. The aims here were to expand Capetian power, support his family and secure their futures. There is little doubt he achieved this. It must be acknowledged, as a family, there were some failed exploits, such as the Tunis Crusade in 1270. Despite this, Charles managed to expand his dynasty’s power by acting as a diplomat, securing tactical marriages and developing extensive influence in the Mediterranean. On top of this, he created an ideology that shaped future generations, and his efforts were crucial to securing the holy prestige of his family. These positive achievements, however, can largely be seen in retrospect and perhaps Charles’ himself would not have realised the extent of his success in this domain during his lifetime. This considered, it is clear Charles was more successful from a dynastic perspective than a papal. This is not to say he was a complete success, but it is reductive to refer to him a failure.
Daisy Gant has just completed her 3rd year of a BA in History at University College London (with a year abroad at the University of Pennsylvania).
Notes: [1] J. Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou: Power, Kingship, and State-Making in Thirteenth Century Europe (London: Routledge, 1998); D. Abulafia, The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms 1200-1500: the Struggle for Dominion. (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 1997) [2] W. E. Welsh, 'Papal Strongman: Charles of Anjou', Medieval Warfare, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2016), p. 20. [3] J. Dunbabin, The French in the Kingdom of Sicily, 1266-1305 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 7. [4] 'Matthew Paris on the Popes and Staufer Italy 1245-1269' in J. Bird, E. Peters and J. M. Powell (eds.), Crusade and Christendom: Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Fall of Acre, 1187-1291 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 409. [5] 'Urban IV to Louis IX Against Manfred, Ecce fili carissime, 1264' in Bird, et at., Crusade and Christendom, p. 412. [6] Dunbabin, The French in the Kingdom of Sicily, p. 8. [7] S. Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 125. [8] M. Lower, The Tunis Crusade of 1270: A Mediterranean History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 68. [9] Abulafia, The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms, p. 57. [10] As quoted in Ibid, p. 57. [11] The Chronicle of Pedro III of Aragon in Bird, et al., Crusade and Christendom, p. 425. [12] Lower, The Tunis Crusade of 1270, p. 59. [13] Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou, pp. 64-70. [14] Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers, p. 130. [15] Quoted in J. L. Goff, Saint Louis (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2009), p. 587. It is also discussed here how Louis himself made use of the titles, showing it was not just Charles who felt this bond. [16] Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers, p. 256. [17] 'Louis IX Writes to France Explaining the Failure of His Crusade, 1250' in Bird, et at., Crusade and Christendom, p. 373. [18] Lower, The Tunis Crusade of 1270, pp. 68-70. [19] 'A Problem of Governance?: Pope Gregory X, Charles of Anjou, and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem' in P. B. Baldwin, Pope Gregory X and the Crusades (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2014), pp. 104-136. [20] Ibid. p.107. [21] D. Abuladia, Charles of Anjou Reassessed, Journal of Medieval History, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2000), pp. 93-114. [22] Dunbabin, The French in the Kingdom of Sicily, p. 189. [23] Abuladia, Charles of Anjou Reassessed, p. 110. [24] As quoted in Dunbabin, The French in the Kingdom of Sicily, p. 190. [25] Ibid, p. 191. [26] As quoted in Le Goff, Saint Louis, p. 587. [27] Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers, p. 255.