The Derg,[1] or the Provisional Military Administration Council (PMAC), was the revolutionary military regime, led by Haile Mariam Mengistu, which ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1987. First assuming power during the 12 September coup which removed Emperor Haile Selassie from power,[2] the Derg’s initial anti-imperialist motivations were repressively transposed to one of staunch Marxism-Leninism, through Mengistu’s 1977-78 ‘Red Terror’, and the assassination of General Tafari Benti.[3] This paper supports the view that this transposition was one of self-interested convenience. Facing insurgencies in Eritrea, Tigray and the Ogaden, socioeconomic and agricultural crises, and the existential necessity of consolidating political power in a socialist transformation, Mengistu understood the desideratum of obtaining the “internationalist revolutionary solidarity” of the Communist Bloc.[4] Most important was the support of the Soviet Union, with Cuba, East Germany, and eastern Europe, playing lesser, varying roles in terms of assistance.
This paper posits the view that the importance of Soviet support was invaluable to the Derg regime. In this view, the adoption of Marxism-Leninism, and its benefits, were of paramount importance to the Derg regime. To this end, this paper will proceed by providing an assessment, and historical context, of Soviet support to the Derg regime, through four dimensions: the political, the military, the economic, and the agricultural.
Firstly, this paper will assess the levels of political assistance given to the Derg regime in its self-interested objective of implementing socialist transformation and consolidating power. Militarily, the impacts of Soviet and socialist support to Mengistu in both the Ogaden War, and the Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgencies will be examined. Ultimately, an economic and agricultural assessment will analyse the impacts of the Derg’semulation of Soviet-styled agricultural policies, namely nationalisation, villagisation, and resettlement. In doing so, the argument that Soviet support was crucial to the Derg regime in that it provided a model and alliance of Marxism-Leninism is evinced. To provide an assessment of Soviet support to the Derg, an overview of the historical context in which Soviet-Derg relations emerged is pertinent. The impetus for revolution in 1970s Ethiopia was born out of a desire to overthrow Haile Selassie and abolish imperialism, not one of ‘ideological conviction’.[5] As such, the Derg initially “lacked ideological uniformity”.[6] It was not until 1976 that the Derg first committed to the ideological “establish[ment of] socialist order through transformation”, under the Programme of the National Democratic Revolution (PDNR).[7] Traditionally, Ethiopia had relied upon the United States for its military and economic support, as Somalia had upon the Soviet Union. For example, between 1951-1976, Ethiopia received over $629 million in combined military and economic aid from the United States.[8] In 1962, the Somalian army was aided $32 million by the Soviet Union, and was also sufficiently equipped militarily by both the Cubans and Soviets.[9] However, when Somali forces invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in the summer of 1977, motivated byirredentism, President Said Barre’s government ‘abrogated’ its Soviet friendship treaty.[10] This culminated in the cessation of weaponry supplies, crucial to Somalia’s power.[11] At the same time, US- Ethiopian relations became strained, eventually breaking down, due to an incompatibility between President Carter’s foreign policy emphasis on human rights, and Mengistu’s clear violation of such, in the ’Red Terror’ opposition repression.[12] This led to the ironic situation in which superpower allegiances in the Horn reversed.[13] As will be demonstrated, the convenience of the Soviet Union’s interest in replacing American influence in Ethiopia, and the ideological model of Marxism-Leninism it offered, played into the self-interested hands of Mengistu.
The appeal to Mengistu for adopting a Marxist-Leninist ideological conviction was two-fold: on the one hand, Marxism-Leninism provided the Derg with a tried-and-tested formula of consolidating political power throughout Ethiopia, without the stifling requirement of democratic procedure.[14] On the other hand, ideological alignment with the Soviet Union offered the Derg the political, economic, military, and infrastructural support it required, through the ’internationalist’ solidarity of the Communist bloc. In May 1977, Mengistu met with Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolai Podgorny and other officials to sign a ’Declaration of Friendship’, after receiving Soviet support for his ’Red Terror’, the aggressive political suppression that solidified his place as head of the Derg.[15] The declaration was the first explicit conferment ofSoviet support for the Derg, in respect to Mengistu’s commitments to aid a ”successful socialist transformation.”[16]
Politically, the Derg was faced with the necessity of consolidating the regime’s power, and in doing so, finding the means to enact a successful ‘socialist transformation.’ To sanction such socialist transformation required aligning with the Communist bloc, the emulation of an established socialist model, and the creation of a vanguard party.[17] The Soviet Union, more so than Maoist China, held the answers for Mengistu. It is important to note that Chinese Maoism had been disregarded by the Derg, particularly between 1975 and 1976, when the regime discredited the ‘indigenous socialist’ Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) for its “Maoist intentions”.[18] Revolutionary Ethiopia expected that alignment with the Soviets and the Communist bloc would culminate in aid ’flowing freely‘ to the regime, “result[ing] in rapid economic development”, and provide the means for consolidating political power.[19] This expectation, as will be evidenced, was not unfounded. Soviet political support provided to the Derg came in two forms: the active support of the Soviet Union for the creation of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party to consolidate power (and the alignment with the Communist bloc) and the passive provision of Marxism-Leninism as an ideological framework for the Derg to implement revolutionary modernizing change, to overturn the imperial legacy.[20]
The Soviets recommended that in order to secure the establishment of the Derg’s dominance over the state and the obtainment of victorious socialist transformation, the creation of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party was required. It was not until December 1979 that preparations for the establishment of a vanguard party began, with the founding of the Commission to Organize the Party of Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE).[21] The establishment of COPWE, as attested by Peter Schwab, was the culmination of increased Soviet and Cuban demands for the Derg to assume ”greater orthodoxy”.[22] Self-interested convenience, however, first appears here in that Mengistu benefitted from the stability, and means to coordinate the revolution, provided by a vanguard party, whereas the Soviets gained little more than a more sturdy, socialist-orientated ally.
Almost five years after the establishment of COPWE, and ten years to the date of the removal of Haile Selassie, the Worker’s Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was founded on 12 September 1984. As the official Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, the WPE had modelled itself closely on Soviet recommendations ”provid[ing] the [Derg] with an effective organization for monitoring and enforcing national policies, both regionally and locally”.[23] The ideological and regime-style affinities helped Mengistu’s Derg to centralize political administration, enabling the modernization of Ethiopia. In return for merely siding with the Soviet Union ideologically, Mengistu obtained billions of dollars in funding and aid, an alliance of ”international solidarity” with socialist states, and the Marxist-Leninist model of which to strengthen his originally fragile government.[24] In terms of alliance, within the bipolar context of Cold War international relations and the socialist premise of ”internationalist solidarity”, the alignment of Ethiopia with the Soviet Union also meant alignment with the Communist bloc: Bulgaria, Cuba, East Germany, Poland, Hungary etc. As will be particularly evident in the later assessment of Soviet responses to the 1983-85 famine, this ’solidarity’ would prove vital to the Derg, in the face of Soviet inaction.
The passive support provided by the Soviet Union, that of the provision of Marxist-Leninist ideology, is, in this paper’s view, more important than Soviet support itself – for it provided a model of rigid government, and a strong international alliance. Christopher Clapham shrewdly identifies four benefits to Mengistu’s adoption of Marxism-Leninism: the provision of a ‘doctrine of revolution, development, and nation-building, and a source of international support.’[25]
The Derg initially lacked ‘ideological unity’ and did not possess the means to successfully implement radical societal change in the revolutionary era. Original Derg policies, such as the ‘ten-point programme’, contained a combination of “socialist and nationalist” facets, which did not subscribe rigidly to Marxist ideology.[26] By subscribing to Marxism-Leninism, Mengistu was provided with a relatable, tried-and-tested means of enacting revolution, and eradicating the political-economic ’power of the Ethiopian aristocracy’.[27]
The similarities between the Russian and Ethiopian revolutions, in their overthrows of imperial autocrats, peasantry uprisings, and subsequent utilisation of brutal ’red terrors’,[28] are stark. Developmentally, the Soviet model of revolution provided the Derg with the means to further their modernizing land reform plans, such as nationalization and the creation of peasant associations, which Anderson-Jaquest argues ”bore a resemblance to [the] tactics advocated by Lenin’s [initially] weak government after the Russian revolution.”[29] This paper will examine the importance of Mengistu’s Soviet-style agricultural policies in detail, when assessing the economic and infrastructural dimensions of Soviet support.
As a ’doctrine of nation-building', the Derg was provided with an established model of politically uniting multiple ethnicities under the uniformity of Marxism-Leninism.[30] In the Soviet Union, Marxism-Leninism acted as the ideological adhesive between Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, to name just a few. Mengistu would have been reassured by this, in facing the issue of unifying Eritrean, Tigrayan, and Western Somali ethnic separatists under Marxism-Leninism, providing the means to consolidate a multi-ethnic, centralized state. This was particularly important given the motivation of many Derg members to protect and enshrine the national unity of Ethiopia.[31]
In view of this assessment, the necessity of Soviet support, both actively and passively, has been evidenced. In establishing a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist state, governed by a strong vanguard party, and the alignment of Ethiopia with the Communist bloc, the Derg would become the direct beneficiary of billions of dollars of aid and equipment, Soviet emulation models, and solid ideological direction, indisputably consolidating its power. This consolidation of political power can be evidenced by the Derg’s successful civilianization into the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1987, with Mengistu remaining as leader until 1991. Without these political provisions, Soviet support economically, militarily, and infrastructurally would not have been permissible.
Militarily, three areas of Soviet support required by the Derg can be identified. Firstly, in the aftermath of deteriorating US-Ethiopian relations, the importance of substituting American military assistance for that of the Soviets was paramount. This was consequential of the Derg’s commitment to restructuring the government based upon Marxist-Leninist interpretations in December 1976, and the subsequent foreign policy of President Carter, which was vehemently opposed Mengistu’s human rights violations.[32] Secondly, Soviet military assistance provided to the Derg in the Ogaden War, the impetus for Soviet- Ethiopian relations, demonstrates the effectiveness of the Soviet military support provided. However, ultimately, when assessing the Soviet impact on the Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgencies, the military limitations of Soviet support are demonstrated.
Alignment with the Soviet Union, in the absence of American support, was invaluable to the Derg in securing the military capabilities it required. Such capabilities were needed to repel domestic insurgencies, in both Eritrea, and Tigray, and to suppress the irredentist nature of Somalia in the Ogaden. From the onset of the Ogaden War until 1985, the Soviet Union supported the Derg regime with over $10 billion in military aid and assistance.[33] It was not until the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev and his foreign policy reform, that this substantial military aid decreased.[34] Soviet military support from 1978-1985, compared with the $279million of military aid the United States provided from 1951-1976, demonstrates the invaluableness of replacing American support promptly with that of the Soviet Union. In over half the tenure of American influence, the Soviets increased their military funding by over 3400 per cent, roughly $1.4 billion extra per annum on average.
In securing victory in the Ogaden War, the military support offered by the Soviet Union and Cuba was fundamental. East German technical support is also of considerable note. The Soviets met with Mengistu in May 1977, two months before the Somali invasion of the Ogaden, to agree on a classified military agreement. The effects of such an agreement supplied the large peasantry with advanced Soviet weaponry.[35] Upon the Somalian abrogation of its Soviet friendship treaty on 13th November 1977, an extensive airlift of Soviet weaponry, equipment, and personnel was initiated. The airlift, as Brind evidences, included 1,500 Soviet officials, around 2,000 East German technicians, and 13,000 Cuban troops.[36] East German support was limited to the ideological education of the military and the police. During the conflict, up to March 1978, the Soviet Union delivered an estimated $1.5 billion of military equipment, “including T-54 tanks and SAM-7 flight missiles“,[37] enabled a decisive Ethiopian repulsion of Somali invaders.[38]
However, despite such Soviet and socialist military support enabling Ethiopian victory in the Ogaden, it inadvertently strengthened Eritrean and Tigrayan insurgencies. The very nature of the military regime was to see military action as the resolution for all political disputes. Given the extent of Soviet military and political support, and the strengthening of Ethiopia’s armed forces, Mengistu’s resolve for a continuation of Soviet-aided military incursions was reinforced. Mengistu launched a counteroffensive against the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in October 1984, equipped with “440,000 active troops, over 750 tanks, and 130aircraft”, as noted by DeWaal.[39] No decisive victories were maintained by the Derg, but in this view, they doomed their counterinsurgency ambitions. By using, and ultimately sacrificing, Soviet weaponry, the EPLF became strengthened by the capture of Soviet equipment and ’spoils of war’.[40] As was the case with the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Mengistu’s refusal to seek political means persistently emboldened the very insurgents he sought to repress. Admittedly, this is an indirect consequence of Soviet military support, however it serves to detract from the unnuanced argument that Soviet support was wholly effective and important to the Derg. Economic and agricultural dimensions of Soviet support to the Derg can be seen to be synonymous, as most infrastructural-agricultural projects were undertaken with the intention of achieving socialist economic mutual benefit.[41] The agricultural crisis facing the Derg, was the Great Famine of 1983-85. Ironically, this was caused by the Derg’s implementation of Soviet recommendations on agricultural reform, and the Derg received futile aid in the face of Soviet-caused disaster. However, the ‘internationalist solidarity’ of the socialist bloc, and the aid of the West, helped to offset these negative implications, suggesting the adoption of Marxism-Leninism was more important than Soviet support, for the Derg regime.
The Derg originally implemented socialist, nationalist, and ‘agrarian’ reforms after the removal of Haile Sellasie in September 1974.[42] After the ’Red Terror’ of 1977-78 with Mengistu’s alignment with Marxism-Leninism, his agricultural policy became centered upon Soviet models, in an attempt at modernization in post-revolutionary Ethiopia. These Soviet models for meaningful socialist land reform included: ’nationalisation‘, ’modernisation‘, ’resettlement’, and ’villagisation.‘[43] The Derg passed the ’PublicOwnership of Rural Lands Proclamation’ in 1975,[44] nationalising all rural lands, commercial farms, establishing ’peasant associations’, and giving the Derg the powers of exacted resettlement for villagization.[45]
Moreover, these Soviet-styled reforms detrimentally exacerbated the agricultural crises Ethiopia had been subjected to oft before – total militarised state control over the food supply and its production left the focused Derg completely reliant upon external humanitarian support when famine hit in 1983. Images of starving children filtered back to the West, triggering an international humanitarian response by late 1984. The United States alone donated $160 million in food aid.[46] This suited the Soviet Union’s interests of allowing the West to supply aid because ”third world economic dislocations are a heritage of [Western] colonial...policies.”[47]
The Soviet Union provided the Derg over $10 billion in military aid between 1978-1985, but offered little more than $3 million in food aid in 1984.[48] The divergence in the importance of Soviet support and Marxist-Leninist support becomes evident, in the responses to the famine. The Eastern socialist bloc contributed over $25 million in food aid to the Derg, with Zhivkov’s Bulgaria donating $12.7 million, alone.[49] This demonstrates two things: firstly, despite the importance of Soviet support politically and military, the Soviet Union relatively abandoned the Derg in its hour of need - a considerable limitation of such support. Secondly, in the absence of Soviet action, the Communist bloc did support the Derg substantially, in an act of internationalist solidarity, suggesting the adoption of Marxism-Leninism bore greater significance to the regime than Soviet support alone. In conclusion, an assessment of the extent to which Soviet support was important to the Derg regime leads one to identify such support as both explicit—the action of Soviet support—and implicit—the provision of, and alignment with, Marxist-Leninist ideology. Whilst explicit Soviet policies of assistance in political establishment, military support, and the provision of revolutionary agricultural models, had an undeniable influence upon the Derg regime, the view that such support was conditionally pinned upon the subscription to Marxism-Leninism, is most convincing. It can also be argued that the ideological conviction of the Derg was fundamentally rooted within its own self-interest.
The Soviet Union provided the Derg with a relatable, anti-imperial revolutionary model, which proved decisive to the Derg’s consolidation of power, creation of a state vanguard party and crucial military successes in the Ogaden. However, this otherwise reliable, consistent support was not supplied in the Derg’s hour of need. The lack of a Soviet humanitarian response to the 1983-85 famine, and the premise that such famine was, in part, consequential of Soviet recommendations, detracts from the view Soviet support was entirely fundamental to the Derg. It does, however, prove Marxism-Leninism to be the foundation of important support to the Derg.
Marxism-Leninism had provided the Derg with the crucial political blueprints for consolidating power and fruitfully resulted in alignment with the Soviet Union, and subsequent receipt of billions of dollars in assistance. It also, crucially, ensured the Derg regime was secured in ‘internationalist solidarity’ with its ideological allies, demonstrated by Soviet-Cuban support militarily, and vital Eastern bloc humanitarian aid provided in the absence of Soviet assistance. Explicit or implicit, it is indisputable that Soviet interest, support, and the provision of Marxism-Leninism, was of imperative self-interested importance to the Derg.
Will Kingston-Cox has just finished his second year of a BA in History and Politics at Warwick University.
Notes: [1] Amharic for ‘committee’, see Harry Brind, ‘Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 40, (Winter, 1983-1984): p. 90. [2] Angence France Prese, ‘Ethiopia Military Assails Emperor’, The New York Times, Sept. 12, 1974, p. 81 https://www.nytimes.com/1974/09/12/archives/ethiopia-military-assails-emperor-he-also-loses-support-of-church.html (last accessed 19 February 2022) [3] Jacob Wiebel, ‘”Let the Red Terror Intensify”: Political Violence, Governance, and Society in Urban Ethiopia, 1976-78', InternationalJournal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 48, (2015), pp. 13-27; led the Derg from November 1974 – February 1977 [4] Jiri Valenta, ‘Soviet-Cuban Intervention in the Horn of Africa: Impact and Lessons’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 2, (1980-81), p. 361 [5] Brind, ‘Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 40 (Winter, 1983-1984), p. 90 [6] Edmond J. Keller, ‘Drought, War, and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, p. 611 [7] Mulatu Wubneh and Yohannis Abate, Ethiopia; Transition and Development in the Horn of Africa (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press,1988) pp. 205-210, in Tommie Crowell Anderson-Jaquest, “Restructuring the Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship: A Case Study in Asymmetric Exchange” (unpublished PhD, University of London, 2002), p. 63 [8] Brind, ‘Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa’, p. 91. [9] Steven David, ‘Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet Advantage, International Security, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 72; Jiri Valenta, ‘Soviet-CubanIntervention in the Horn of Africa: Impact and Lessons’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1980-81), p. 353. [10] Valeta, ‘Soviet-Cuban Intervention’, p. 95. [11] Ibid, pp. 94-96 [12] Keller, ‘Drought, War, and the Politics of Famine', p. 613; Wiebel, ‘”Let the Red Terror Intensify”', pp. 13-27 [13] Valenta, ‘Soviet-Cuban Intervention in the Horn of Africa', p. 353 [14] Paul B. Henze, ‘The Ethiopian Revolution: Mythology and History’, Northeast African Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2/3 (1990), pp. 3-4 [15] ’Ethiopia and Soviet Sign Agreements on Closer Tie’, The New York Times, May 7, 1977, p. 3 Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/05/07/archives/ethiopia-and-soviet-sign-agreements-on-closer-tie.html> [Accessed 19 February 2022] [16] Anderson-Jaquest, “Restructuring the Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship', p. 66. [17] Ibid, pp. 9-10 [18] Colin Legum and Bill Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa (London: Rex Collings,1977), p. 44, in Anderson-Jaquest, '“Restructuring the Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship"', p. 66 [19] Henze, ‘The Ethiopian Revolution', pp. 3-4. [20] Anderson-Jaquest, “Restructuring the Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship', p. 69. [21] Ibid, p. 67. [22] Peter Schwab, ‘Political Change and Famine in Ethiopia’, Current History, Vol. 84, No. 502, North Africa (May 1985), p. 222. [23] Anderson-Jaquest, '“Restructuring the Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship"', p. 69 [24] Diana L. Ohlbaum, ‘Ethiopia and the Construction of Soviet Identity, 1974-1991', Northeast African Studies, Vol. 1 (1994), pp. 63-89 [25] Christopher Clapham, ‘The socialist experience in Ethiopia and its demise’, The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2, (1992), pp. 107-110 [26] Christopher Clapham, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 45-46, in Anderson-Jaquest, '“Restructuring the Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship"', p. 62. [27] Ibid. [28] Sergei Melgunov, ’The Record of the Red Terror’, Current History (1916-1940), Vol. 27, No. 2, (1927), pp. 198-205. [29] Anderson-Jaquest, '“Restructuring the Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship"', p.184. [30] Clapham, ‘The socialist experience in Ethiopia and its demise’, pp. 107-110. [31] Ibid, p. 108 [32] Anderson-Jaquest, “Restructuring the Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship"', pp. 104-106 [33] Reuters, ’Soviets Pull Out Advisers at Ethiopia Fronts’, The New York Times (22nd March 1990), Sect. A, p. 12 Available at:<https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/22/world/soviets-pull-out-advisers-at-ethiopia-fronts.html> [Accessed 19 February 2022] [34] Anderson-Jaquest, '“Restructuring the Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship"', pp. 66-76 [35] Brind, ‘Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa’, p. 85 [36] Ibid. [37] Valenta, ‘Soviet-Cuban Intervention in the Horn of Africa', p. 363. [38] Ibid, p. 93. [39] Alex DeWaal, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), p. 182, in Anderson-Jaquest, “Restructuring the Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship"', p. 118. [40] Anderson-Jaquest, “Restructuring the Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship"', p. 118. [41] Ibid., p. 66. [42] Clapham, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, pp. 45-46, in Anderson-Jaquest, '“Restructuring the Soviet-Ethiopian Relationship"', p. 62; Anderson-Jaquest, “Restructuring the Soviet-EthiopianRelationship", p. 175. [43] Ibid, p. 175 [44] "Public Ownership Of Rural Lands Proclamation No. 31/1975.", Ecolex.Org, 2022 <https://www.ecolex.org/details/legislation/public-ownership-of-rural-lands-proclamation-no-311975-lex-faoc003096/> [Accessed 1 March 2022] [45] Clapham, ‘The socialist experience in Ethiopia and its demise’, p. 107. [46] Schwab, ‘Political Change and Famine in Ethiopia’, p. 223. [47] Ibid. [48] Ibid, pp. 222-223. [49] Ibid, p. 223.