Introduction:
In the wake of Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union witnessed a power struggle at the top of the Central Committee. This saw Khrushchev, ultimately, prevail and the removal of the old powers such as Molotov and Malenkov. During his premiership, Khrushchev sought to redefine leadership and de-Stalinise the Soviet Union till he was, eventually, ousted in 1964. Rather ironically, he was accused by the Party of attempting to cultivate a personality cult like that of Stalin.
In his time as leader, he took advantage of the unique cultural moment of the late 1950s and early 1960s. A replacement for Stalin was needed to stabilise the turmoil his death brought. Khrushchev made use of technological advances to present a new, accessible leader. He had unprecedented access to mass media, broadcasting and travel compared to those before him, and he employed this to redefine leadership in the post-Stalin period. In response to the trauma the Soviet Union had faced, a more liberalised atmosphere was required, and Khrushchev understood promoting this to an extent would consolidate his popularity. This does not, however, mean he turned to democracy, and there were limitations. Khrushchev saw himself as the cultural authority and this is seen through analysis of three facets of his image: The Uncle, the Art Critic and the Travelling Salesman. Considering works by the likes of Condee and Larson together with contemporary newspaper publications and Khrushchev’s speeches, it is clear he took advantage of a changed society to present a new, more human image of leadership.[1]
The Uncle:
In the post-Stain period, Khrushchev knew it would be impossible to recreate the powerful paternal role Stalin had crafted. To create a new image of leadership and separate himself from the atrocities of Stalin’s rule, while still maintaining the same level of authority, Khrushchev sought to establish himself as ‘The Uncle’ figure. First, he used of the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 to create an explicit break in leadership. The Secret Speech was ‘a condemnation of Stalin the person and not of the Stalinist system’, and here Khrushchev began to redefine leadership in front of the Party.[2] By pointing to ‘a grave abuse of power by Stalin’ and ‘the use of the cruellest repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality’, Khrushchev sent a clear message of de-Stalinisation.[3] McCauley suggested possible reasons for him giving this speech were to either lift the sense of fear and allow the now effective party to transform the world, or to undermine the credibility of his rivals.[4] Either way, the speech acted as a dawn of a new era of leadership, of apparent transparency and openness. Fedor Burlatskii, who held a position on the Central Committee in the late 1950s, wrote ‘Khrushchev appeared precisely as the people’s hope, the precursor of a new age’, suggesting his de-Stalinisation efforts, including the Secret Speech, were his biggest legacy.[5] This considered, the importance of public address in the cultivating of Khrushchev’s new leadership cannot be understated. As Condee argued, the speech marked a ‘lateral shift in the dynastic pattern, making the innocence of the uncle in the sins of the father’.[6] By disavowing Stalin, without discrediting the Stalinist system, Khrushchev established his authority without having to take the burden of historical cruelties.
Carlson argued ‘Khrushchev was a warm, folksy contrast to Stalin, who was aloof and vengeful as the Old Testament God’.[7] This was certainly the image he cultivated in the public sphere. Having consolidated his new leadership within the Party, his made use of the press to present a more hands on, personable leader rather than the removed father figure of Stalin. Comparing the leaders’ presence in Pravda illuminates Khrushchev’s accessibility to the press. In September 1964 two thirds of issues contained at least one photo of Khrushchev compared with one of Stalin in September 1954.[8] Though this increase could be put down to a general increased accessibility to photography, there were also a larger number of Khrushchev’s works published. Seven of his addresses to USSR audiences and an interview with a Japanese delegation were released in the magazine in one month alone.[9] This was a marked change from Stalin, who Larson argued made ‘a conscious decision of propaganda strategy not to associate … closely with domestic and foreign policy moves of transient significance’.[10] This increased presence in media, showing Khrushchev’s direct involvement in affairs, then, can be taken as an active attempt to present a new leadership. He used the news to style as the spokesman of the Soviet government, rather than a removed, god-like being.
The Art Critic:
Another facet of Khrushchev’s public image was the Art Critic. His role as the critic showed him to be an active part of cultural policy as well as emphasised the growing, although still limited, diversity of culture. By publicly asserting himself as the ‘premier art critic and first among the viewers’, Khrushchev juxtaposed himself against Stalin as ‘the supreme architect of Socialist realism’, Reid suggested.[11] The 1962 Manège Affair is the clearest example of Khrushchev ‘The Art Critic’. The 30 Years of MOSKh exhibition, Condee argues, shows he cast aside Stalin’s image of the ‘great scholar’ and cultural authority, instead embracing ‘the identity of the cultural essayist of his time’.[12] The leader’s visit was highly publicised, as shown in Figure 1, and he used this to display his active role in culture.[13] He critiqued much of the artwork displayed and, famously, lost his temper over the abstract content. Khrushchev told one artist ‘it is a pity, of course, that your mother is dead, but maybe it’s lucky for her that she can’t see how her son is spending his time’.[14] He told another ‘We should take down your pants and set you down in a clump of nettles until you understand your mistakes. You should be ashamed. Are you a pederast or a normal man?’.[15] This rawness of opinion being expressed so vocally and publicly assisted Khrushchev in moving away from Stalin’s image of leadership.
The content of his commentary also helped cultivate a new image of leadership. As the above examples indicate, Khrushchev was not opposed to direct and harsh criticism. Shakhnazrov argued he had a ‘popular wisdom and peasant cunning… simplicity and openness in interactions with people’ but a primitive art taste and little interest in serious music or painting.[16] His use of language and temper did much to humanise him in comparison with the more removed Stalin. In many cases he was open about his lack of artistic understanding, at the Manège Exhibit declaring one artwork looked ‘as though some child had done his business on the canvas’ and ‘I don’t understand Picasso’.[17] Through use of common, sometimes inappropriate language, Khrushchev styled himself as, what Shakhnozrov described as, ‘the peasantry on the throne’.[18] He established himself as “the people’s” authority on art, suggesting if he did not understand, neither would anyone else. Condee argued more is known about Khrushchev’s views on art than any other leader and that he had ‘a public and official love for the provisional, the extemporaneous, the profane and the essayistic’.[19] This reveals much about his methods of cultivating an image of an accessible, human leadership. He styled himself as folksy and “of the people”, aiming to get his opinions to the public in a manner they would identify with. In this way, he took advantage of the increasingly liberalised atmosphere in the wake of Stalinism to establish his own brand of authority through media.
The Travelling Salesman:
The third avenue through which to analyse Khrushchev’s new image is through his presentation as ‘The Travelling Salesman’ of Socialism. Larson argued his ‘image was that of an active, earthly human leader who travelled widely… who voiced ideas and politics on a wide range of questions, who served as a spokesman of the regime’.[20] Of particular importance were the American Exhibition in Moscow and his trip to the United States in 1959. These instances show how Khrushchev used media opportunities to project an image of a new open and more human leadership, both at home and internationally. Hixson argued ‘although well-conceived and smoothly executed the Soviet Exhibition had little hope of fundamentally altering American mass perceptions of the USSR’, it is clear this is not entirely true of Khrushchev’s personal tour of America.[21] The press coverage generated was crucial to the establishment of a new, accessible, leadership within the Soviet Union, and of respectable, peaceful government internationally. Pictures like Figure 2 were circulated and episodes like this did much to boost Khrushchev’s positive reception in America.[22] During the trip, his personality shone through and allowed many Americans to view him more favourably. Cracking jokes like “see no horns” and bringing his family along with him meant the foreign press portrayed him as a human face of socialism, with a Gallup poll saying half of Americans approved of his invitation to the States.[23] While there was some hostility, Khrushchev managed to captivate people’s interest. Saul Pett wrote in the New York Times ‘we have been everywhere and done everything with Nikita S. Khrushchev. We have chased him… we have seen him tickle pigs, kiss babies’.[24]These examples show how Khrushchev made use of the specific, cultural, moment to ensure he had a new image of leadership post-Stalin. He used mass media and technological advancements to insert himself into domestic life as well as public, with millions watching television shows like Mr. Khrushchev Abroad on ABC in America.[25] Instead of an all-seeing, removed, father figure, he was an accessible, passionate leader. Not only did this visit sell Khrushchev to the Americans but it also helped his reception at home. Garthoff argued ‘he saw his reception in America (he received full honours as head of state although he did not hold that title) as according himself personally, and by extension the USSR, equality with President Eisenhower and the United States’.[26] In this way, his ‘proactive, erratic diplomacy’ worked to send a message to the Soviet people that he, and therefore they, were respected internationally.[27]
The “Kitchen Debate” is another example of Khrushchev using press and broadcasting to cultivate new images of leadership. The impromptu exchange with Vice-President Nixon at the American Exhibition in 1959 gained much publicity, being described by Time magazine as ‘peacetime diplomacy’s most amazing 24 hours’.[28] Khrushchev took advantage of the opportunity to corner the Vice-President and debate the merits of their ideologies in front of the world’s press, with Reid arguing ‘in the context of “peaceful economic competition” the kitchen and consumption had become a site for power plays’.[29] Amid the sometimes tense, sometimes comical back and forth, Khrushchev declaring ‘I know that I am dealing with a good lawyer… You are a lawyer for capitalism, and I am a lawyer for communism’, there is a particular emphasis on media.[30] The pair agreed to broadcast the episode in their respective countries, ensuring their messages reach the public. In doing so the importance of new technology in Khrushchev’s public image was clear. He saw personal media appearances as central to presenting himself as an accessible, human figure but also to showing his strength, holding his own against the Western leaders. This, in turn, reflected the greatness of the Soviet regime.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, Khrushchev’s ascension to leadership came at a cultural moment that allowed him to cultivate an open and human image in the post-Stalin period. Knowing he would be unable to replicate a Stalinist authority, he made use of new media technologies, like mass press and television, to present a different type of leadership both nationally and internationally. Technological changes meant it was more possible than ever assert himself in all spheres of life. In this sense, Khrushchev’s self-presentation as passionate and powerful was extremely tactical, despite what episodes like the shoe-banging incident at the United Nations in 1960 suggest. Following the great hardships within the Soviet Union, it was clear there needed to be a change in leadership direction, while maintaining the authority of socialist ideology. By becoming the Uncle, the Art Critic, the Travelling Salesman, Khrushchev established himself as different from Stalin, as present and human. He allowed increased press coverage and genuine, uncontrolled public appearances to spread this message. Internationally, Khrushchev used his visits to the US and outbursts to create a personable image of Soviet leadership, creating a more favourable image of the USSR and socialism abroad. At the hight of the Cold War and Nuclear Brinkmanship, attempting to move away from total-war rhetoric and promote peaceful coexistence through leadership, was a clever and tactical move.
Daisy Gant has just completed her 3rd year of a BA in History at University College London (with a year abroad at the University of Pennsylvania).
Full title when assigned: How did Khrushchev cultivate a new image of leadership in the post-Stalin period?
Notes: [1] N. Condee, 'Cultural Codes of the Thaw' in W. Taubman, S. Khrushchev & A. Gleason (eds.), Nikita Khrushchev (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 160-176; T. B. Larson, Dismantling the Cults of Stalin and Khrushchev. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1968), pp. 383-390. [2] M. McCauley, The Khrushchev Era 1953-1964 (London: Longmam, 1995), p.42. [3] N. Khrushchev, The Cult of the Individual - Part 1 (1956) [4] McCauley, The Khrushchev Era, pp. 43-44. [5] As quoted in D. Nordlander, 'Khrushchev's Image in the Light of Glasnost and Perestroika', The Russian Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 (1993), p. 252. [6] Condee, Cultural Codes of the Thaw, p. 163. [7] P. Carlson, K Blows Top: A Cold War Comic Interlude, Starring Nikita Khrushchev, America's Most Unlikely Tourist. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010), p. 26. [8] Larson, Dismantling the Cults of Stalin and Khrushchev, p. 384. [9] Ibid. p. 385. [10] Ibid. p. 358. [11] S. E. Reid, 'In the Name of the People: The Manege Affiar Revisited', Kritika, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2005), p. 673. [12] Condee, Cultural Codes of the Thaw, p. 171. [13] G. Yelshevskaya, The Thaw and the 1960s: The Birth of the Underground (2016) [14] N. Khrushchev, Khrushchev on Modern Art (1962). [15] Ibid. [16] G. Shakhnazrov, 'Khrushchev and Gorbachev: A Russian View' in W. Taubman, S. Khrushchev & A. Gleason (eds.), Nikita Khrushchev (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 301-320. [17] Khrushchev, Khrushchev on Modern Art. [18] Shakhnazrov, Khrushchev and Gorbachev, p. 311. [19] Condee, Cultural Codes of the Thaw, p. 170. [20] Larson, Dismantling the Cults of Stalin and Khrushchev, p. 384. [21] W. L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998). [22] 'This week in history: Soviet leader Khrushchev visits the United States', Deseret News (2015) [23] Quoted in L. J. Nelson & M. G. Schoenbachler, Nikita Khrushchev's Journey into America (Lawrence: Kansas, 2019), pp. 4-5. [24] Quoted in ibid. p. 2. [25] Ibid. p. 3. [26] R. L. Garthoff, Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary during the Cold War (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), p. 24. [27] Ibid. p. 27. [28] Hixson, Parting the Curtain, p. 349. [29] S. E. Reid, 'Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev', Slavic Review, Vol. 61, No. 2 (2002), p. 233. [30] R. Nixon & N. Khrushchev, 'The "Kitchen Debate" (July 24, 1959)' in: R. Perlstein (ed.), Richard Nixon: Speeches, Writings, Documents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 88-96.
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