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Writer's pictureHarriet Solomon

Mediation and Facilitation: Peace Talks in the Arab-Israeli War


Yizhak Rabin (left), Bill Clinton (centre) and Yasser Arafat (right) at the signing of the Oslo Accord on the 13th September 1993

Any peace process involving the presence of a third party raises questions as to the nature and extent of this participation. With reference to Hilde Henriksen Waage’s conception of mediator and facilitator,[1] this essay seeks to differentiate between the roles played by Presidents Carter and Clinton, and Norwegian Academics Mona Juul and Terje Rød-Larsen, in the Arab-Israeli negotiations at Camp David in 1978 and 2000, and in Oslo in 1993. From Carter’s active mediatory approach that bridged the gap between Egypt and Israel culminating in two distinct agreements, to the success of Norway’s neutral facilitation in establishing The Declaration of Principles, the substantial positive influence of third-party involvement will be illuminated. Despite this however, this essay seeks to demonstrate that external participation can only achieve so much. As a result of the implications of inflexible parties, geopolitical loyalties and limited domestic capabilities, even the steps taken in 1978 and 1992 were small ones. Highlighted most aptly in Clinton’s failure to achieve any agreement in 2000, without the right environment, mediation does not guarantee a positive outcome. In this, third-party involvement is best understood as a small element of a set of wider criteria necessary for success when attempting to induce peace.


CAMP DAVID: 1978 – The Mediation of Jimmy Carter

In 1978, secret negotiations mediated by King Hassan II of Morocco between Israel and Egypt reached a deadlock over control of the West Bank and the Palestinian right to self-determination. Believing their failure lay in the lack of authoritative parties in attendance, US President Carter extended an invitation to Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat to move forward at Camp David.[2] In examination of the active nature of his mediation, this section will highlight the significant role played by the United States and its President in creating the structure, environment, and political pressure necessary to bring about two unprecedented agreements: a framework for bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel, and a wider plan for a ‘just, comprehensive and durable settlement’ across the Middle East.[3]


From the wooded, retreat-like setting of Camp David that encouraged a degree of camaraderie between adversaries,[4] to the privacy such a location enabled (a strict control of the flow of information to outside media was maintained),[5] the United States provided the environment in which progress could be made. Where previous negotiations had consisted of informal discussions between low-level politicians, Camp David offered the first opportunity for state-leaders to convene in the same location with a single purpose. Beyond these geographic considerations, it was Carter’s personal conceptualisation of his role as a ‘full partner’ in negotiations that created the structure responsible for their success.[6] From his encouragement of an international foundation in his support for reference to UN Resolutions in both frameworks, to his detail-orientated approach that saw him negotiating into the early hours,[7] annotating large-scale maps of the Sinai by hand,[8] and editing every draft of the accords himself,[9] Carter’s hands-on approach and diplomatic stamina ensured sustained progress. The importance of this is evidenced in the events following the breakdown of negotiations between Sadat and Begin over the resolution of the Sinai. Had the two parties been in discussion without the presence of an external mediator, it is unlikely the process would have continued. Owing to both Carter’s shift towards shuttle-diplomacy between the two delegations, and, more importantly, the considerable political influence of the United States (with both financial aid at stake and the threat of broken relations with a global superpower explicitly articulated), neither side were willing to walk away.[10]


While academics like Tom Princen have attributed Carter’s commitment to a personal adherence to ‘moral standards’,[11] the reality is more complex. A 1978 June poll found that 42% of Americans believed their President not to be ‘in control’ of US political affairs.[12] On the basis of a desire to redefine this reputation, Carter initiated Camp David. Although the 1978 negotiations culminated in two agreements, the vague language (no attempt was made to define Palestinian ‘autonomy’) and non-committal time frames in both can partly be attributed to the nature of US mediation. From a realisation that in order to conclude both frameworks, Begin could not be pressured into a total freeze on settlements,[13] to the loyalties at play in Washington (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee consistently lobbied the White House against consideration of a Palestinian homeland),[14] Carter chose to allow ambiguities in order to adhere to domestic concerns. Understanding the positive implications for his legacy on securing a peace agreement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, sacrifices were made. Consider this alongside US involvement’s impact on the absence of both the PLO (dismissed on the grounds of their rejection of Resolution 242),[15] and Jordan (tense US-Jordanian relations meant they were not present to clarify the Palestinian responsibility awarded to them in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East ),[16] and the role played by external mediation in contributing to the limitations of Camp David is highlighted. Without third-party involvement, the progress made in 1978 would not have occurred. Carter’s participatory mediation and the presence of a strong political power like the US forced both Sadat and Begin to remain engaged in the peace process despite their differences. A logical consequence of such active involvement, however, is that the domestic requirement to succeed politically took priority over ensuring the details of Palestine’s future.


OSLO: 1993 – Norwegian Facilitation

The decades following the 1978 Camp David talks were largely ones of disappointment. While the frameworks agreed under Carter offered an important step, the details of the peace in question remained highly contested. Commencing in 1993 and spanning fourteen sessions over an eight-month period, the Oslo track emerged as an attempt to overcome the deadlock reached in Madrid over Israeli opposition to PLO involvement.[17] In discussions between Academic Yair Hirschfeld, Norwegian social scientists Terje Rød-Larsen and Mona Juul and PLO Treasurer Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala),[18] conversations in Oslo offered a stark contrast to the tense formalities of US mediation at Camp David (and to an extent, discussions in Washington during this time). Instead, the Oslo process symbolised a period of open conversation and gradual progress encouraged by a loose and neutral Norwegian facilitation. Although the methods of their external involvement were significantly different, however, the similarities between negotiations in Oslo and Carter’s 1978 Camp David are numerous. While some of this comparison takes a positive form in 1993’s success in creating codified Accords resemblant of the frameworks produced fifteen years prior (including a mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO in the form of letters between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin, and a Declaration of Principles setting an agenda for negotiations on Palestinian self-government),[19] both processes are also united in their issues. The section that follows thus seeks to highlight that although a less heavy-handed facilitatory approach had its benefits, external mediators in Norway and the agreements they helped produce were equally as limited as those that preceded them.


Hilde Henriksen Waage clarifies the distinction between mediator and facilitator. Where Jimmy Carter adopted an approach of active involvement, Waage stresses that the Norwegian academics involved in the early stages of the Oslo process were considerably more removed from the details of negotiations. Their facilitation involved arranging practicalities, from booking flights and hotels, to arranging opportunities for informal contact between both parties, academics like Juul and Larsen sought the creation of a neutral and informal environment designed to encourage collaboration.[20] This ‘gentle’ approach meant Norwegian facilitators could establish ground rules (key tenets like the mandating of total secrecy and the prohibition of dwelling on past grievances) in a manner that lacked the sense of threat and coercion at play when the third-party in question occupies a more powerful political position globally. While negotiations in 1978 had also operated on the basis of secrecy, although the details of Camp David were unbeknownst to the public, the attention of the world had remained fixated on the closed doors of its eleven cabins throughout. In contrast, in its origins as grass-root discussions on theory and principles between academics as opposed to state leaders, the Oslo Process afforded its participants an unprecedented degree of privacy and freedom. Creating an atmosphere that allowed both parties to explore the other’s respective position without the commitment or legal implications involved in formal negotiations between Israeli officials and the PLO,[21] Norwegian facilitation sought to establish a micro-level of trust between adversaries that would eventually translate on a wider stage.[22] While the nature of the Declaration of Principles that followed serves to highlight the somewhat flawed logic involved in this suggestion, without the ‘Oslo Spirit’ of friendliness and the diplomatic progress it inspired, it is unlikely that Arafat and Rabin would have found themselves in a position where mutual recognition was even a possibility.


While the sense of equality and camaraderie created by Norway’s relatively insignificant political reputation had a positive impact on encouraging open discussion between Israel and the PLO, their limited domestic influence can also be used to understand the flawed nature of the Declaration of Principles it created. Norwegian academics, acting as informal spokespeople for a neutral facilitating party, did not have access to the same tools available to the USA in 1978. Unable to provide the financial aid or political threat that inspired commitment in Begin, Norway lacked the means with which to apply pressure on the Israeli delegation, a fact that became even more apparent with the formalisation of their representation and the arrival of Uri Savir in May. Described by Waage as a fatal flaw in the facilitative approach, the sense of ‘equality’ this method fosters thus exists only on a superficial level – in reality, the potential of a powerless facilitator is no more than the strongest party will allow.[23] In practice, this dynamic revealed itself in the Norwegian tendency to bow to the demands of Israeli representatives. From pressuring Arafat into committing to political decisions over the telephone in broken English, to the almost sole focus of Norway’s spokespeople on encouraging flexibility in Abu Ala,[24] external participation in the Oslo Process suffered from a pro-Israeli bias. Academics like Avi Shlaim have applauded the Declaration of Principles as the ‘mother of all breakthroughs in the century-old conflict’,[25] however, Norway’s inability to apply any real pressure on Israel means the reality is quite different. Reminiscent of its 1978 predecessor, the DOP offers the same ambiguities arguably to be expected from a document outlining ‘principles’ as opposed to a detailed plan of action. From the addition of appendixes clarifying that decisions on withdrawal will be subject to negotiation with Israel, to its deferral of key questions like the division of Jerusalem to future final status talks,[26] the document consistently fails to address the most contentious issues. Although in 1978 this tendency towards ambiguity and non-committal clauses can be traced to US political concerns, and in Norway is instead partly the result of a facilitating power unequipped to tackle the disparity between adversaries, in both cases the outcome was the same. With third-party involvement limited by external factors, both Camp David and the Oslo Process left Palestinians in particular, unconvinced of their supposed success.


CAMP DAVID: 2000 – The Mediation of Bill Clinton

Arguably, the negotiations at Camp David in 2000 should have been the most successful thus far. Combining the symbolic setting of earlier successes, the ‘friendly’ atmosphere crafted in Norway in 1993 and a stronger mediating power with the ability to apply pressure on both sides in the form of Bill Clinton, the failure to produce any formal agreement might appear somewhat strange. It is in consideration of both the nature of third-party involvement, and more importantly, the wider circumstances in which this intervention took place, that the ultimate lack of success in 2000 is explained.


From the offset, the aims of these negotiations were ambitious. Hoping to build on both rejuvenated calls for peace sparked by the election of Ehud Barak in 1999 and the limited progress made along the Stockholm Track before discussions reached a deadlock in May, it was hoped that Camp David would bring about the conclusion of both a Framework Agreement (FAPS) and Comprehensive Agreement (CAPS) on Permanent Status.[27] Conducted in an American-curated atmosphere of causal camaraderie (from the lack of business attire to opportunities for delegations to dine and exercise alongside each other),[28] Clinton combined a hands-on style mediation that identified him as the architect of the environment with an emphasis on informality. Hosting a variety of discussions, from committee meetings on individual issues like water and the economy, to one-on-ones with each state leader, and the familiar maintenance of privacy in the issuing of only a single phone to each delegation,[29] Bill Clinton’s active approach was initially successful in encouraging serious discussion.


Despite this, however, the fourteen days that Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat spent negotiating eventually proved fruitless. The reasons for this failure are twofold. First, as in previous cases, the mediator in question played a significant role. While on a surface level, the discussions at Camp David in 2000 might appear to be almost entirely resemblant of those conducted by Jimmy Carter two decades earlier, they could not have been more different. Although both Presidents had hoped to use their respective negotiations as a tool to conjure domestic support, Bill Clinton’s desire for a crowning political achievement lacked the foundations of morality and principle on which Carter built his reputation. Consider this lack of personal appeal alongside the implications of the geopolitical environment in which negotiations took place, and the ultimate failure of Camp David appears almost inevitable. Having stressed to Clinton on numerous occasions that the moment was far from ripe for peace (particularly considering the lack of agreement between Israel and Palestine in Stockholm), when the US chose to proceed anyway, Yasser Arafat arrived at Camp David disillusioned.[30] Believing his presence to be a result of Clinton’s domestic aspirations that saw the need to conclude peace before Barak suffered from a vote of no confidence, a two-against-one dynamic was established. Not only did the US President fail to prepare the ground for Arab negotiation in disregarding Arafat’s initial concerns, but his consistently pro-Israel stance also meant he lacked respect from the Palestinian delegation.[31] Without this foundation of mutual trust between party and mediator, the conflict between Israel and Palestine on issues like the boundaries of withdrawal, and the reluctance of both parties to compromise (for Barak a simple expression of willing had sparked the end of his political career) proved irreconcilable. In this, the fact remains that external involvement can only achieve so much on its own – when the political moment is not itself conducive to peace, even the most successful mediator is likely to fail.


Concluding Remarks

Both the nature and roles of third-party actors in the Arab-Israeli peace processes of 1978, 1993 and 2000 differed. From Jimmy Carter’s active mediatory participation, to a more neutral style of Norwegian facilitation, external involvement in the 20th century succeeded in creating an environment angled towards progress. Culminating in three formal agreements, it was the collaborative spirit created by academics in Oslo and the influence of US presence that allowed adversaries on both sides of the conflict to co-operate. Despite this, however, these talks are as united in their flaws as they are their successes. With the influence of personal ambition and limited domestic strength establishing an Israeli bias in both instances, the agreements created lacked substance. It is in the case of Bill Clinton’s 2000 Camp David talks however, when the limiting implications of active mediation were combined with an unfavourable political moment, that the finite capabilities of third-party participants are illuminated. In refusing to address Palestinian concerns in favour of pushing peace for the sake of his own reputation, Clinton failed to establish a sense of trust. Consider this alongside the lack of confidence in both parties (a result of tense personal relations and the failure of earlier attempts at peace) and even the President’s hands-on approach lacked the ability to force reconciliation. In this, and in the vague ambiguities of the agreements created decades earlier, the ultimately limited nature of external involvement is highlighted.



 

Harriet Solomon is currently working towards an MA in Modern History at the London School of Economics.

[1] Hilde Henriksen Waage, ‘Norway’s Role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Strong State and a Weak Belligerent’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 34:4 (2005), p. 8. [2] Kirsten E. Schulze, The Arab-Israeli Conflict (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 53-54. [3] ‘Camp David Accords – The Framework for Peace in the Middle East’, National Archives, (1978)<https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/framework_for_peace_in_the_middle_east> [Accessed 3 May 2021]. [4] Daniel Strieff, Jimmy Carter and the Middle East: The Politics of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 124. [5] Ibid, p. 121. [6] ‘Statement by President Carter prior to his departure for Camp David – 3 September 1978’, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pp. 4-5, (1977-1979) <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook3/pages/190%20statement%20by%20president%20carter%20prior%20to%20his%20dep.aspx> [Accessed May 5 2021]. [7] Kenneth W. Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 252. [8] Strieff, Jimmy Carter and the Middle East, p. 130. [9] Ibid, p. 122. [10] Shibley Telhami, ‘Evaluating Bargaining Performance: The Case of Camp David’, Political Science Quarterly, 107:4 (1992-93), pp. 630-631. [11] Tom Princen, ‘Camp David: Problem-Solving or Power Politics as Usual?’, Journal of Peace Research, 28:1 (1991), p. 58. [12] Strieff, p. 123. [13] Janice J. Terry, ‘The Carter Administration and the Palestinians’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 12:1/2 (1990), p. 159. [14] Ibid, p. 155. [15] Ibid, p. 157. [16] Nigel Ashton, ‘Taking Friends for Granted: The Carter Administration, Jordan and the Camp David Accords 1977-1980’, Diplomatic History, 41:3 (2017), p. 620. [17] Schulze, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 80. [18] Avi Shlaim, ‘The Oslo Accord’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 23:3 (1994), p. 30. [19] Ibid, pp. 24-25. [20] Waage, ‘Norway’s Role in the Middle East Peace Talks’, p. 8. [21] Schulze, p. 80. [22] Jane Corbin, Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Peace Between Israel and the PLO (London: Bloomsbury, 1994), p. 67. [23] Waage, pp. 19-20. [24] Ibid, p. 18. [25] Shlaim, ‘The Oslo Accord’, p. 24. [26] Ziad Abu Amr, ‘The View from Palestine: In the Wake of the Agreement,’ Journal of Palestine Studies, 23:2 (1994), p. 77. [27] Schulze, pp. 83-84. [28] Akram Hanieh, ‘The Camp David Papers,’ Journal of Palestine Studies, 30:2 (2001), p. 77 [29] Ibid, pp. 77-78. [30] Ibid, p. 76. [31] Ian S. Lustick, ‘Camp David II: The Best Failure and Its Lessons’, Israel Studies Bulletin, 16:2, (2001), p. 5.

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